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~ June 2003~
Federal Circuit Confirms the Requirement of Cross-Referencing Related Patent Applications During Prosecution Before the U.S. PTO

On May 23, 2003, the Federal Circuit rendered a Decision in Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc. (Appeal No. 02-1497), wherein the Court confirmed the requirement that applicants must disclose to the U.S. PTO the existence of copending applications that claim similar, but perhaps patentably indistinct, subject matter.

In the Dayco case, the patentee identified the existence of the first application to the Examiner in charge of the second application, but did not identify the second application to the Examiner in charge of the first application.  One of the issues in the Dayco case was whether this failure to cross-reference both applications rendered the patents unenforceable.

The Federal Circuit began its discussion by confirming that there are two standards by which the materiality of a reference can be determined.  The first standard, which has been applied consistently by the Federal Circuit for quite some time, uses the “reasonable Examiner” standard, and analyzes whether a “reasonable Examiner” would have considered the information important in deciding whether to allow the subject application.  The Federal Circuit explained that any information, not just prior art, could fall within the class of “material” information that the applicant is required to disclose to the Examiner.

The Federal Circuit also recognized the 1992 Amendment that the PTO made to Rule 56, which requires disclosure of material information that establishes either “a prima facie case of unpatentablity” or “refutes, or is inconsistent with a position that applicant takes.”

Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit did not decide which standard of materiality should be applied, since the Court concluded that the information that was omitted in the Dayco case (i.e., the existence of both applications) is “material” under either definition.

With respect to the failure to cross-reference both applications, the Federal Circuit stated that the MPEP makes clear that “if an inventor has different applications pending in which similar subject matter but patentably indistinct claims are present, that fact must be disclosed to the Examiner of each of the involved applications.”  MPEP §2001.06(b)(emphasis added by the Court).  The Court then explained that a second pending application is highly material to the prosecution of a first application where the second application could have conceivably served as the basis for a double-patenting rejection in the first application.

It is, of course, impossible to determine whether any given Examiner within the U.S. PTO could “conceivably” assert a double-patenting rejection in any given application.  Accordingly, one could interpret the Dayco case as requiring applicants to cross-reference all applications that relate to similar subject matter, especially if the claims pending in the applications could “conceivably” give rise to a double-patenting rejection.

The Federal Circuit also explained that the existence of copending applications is “material” information since the Examiner in a first application could be asserting a rejection that an Examiner in a second application may find helpful in deciding whether to allow the second application.  The Federal Circuit explained this point as follows:

            Patent disclosures are often very complicated, and different Examiners with different technical background and levels of understanding may often differ when interpreting such documents.  Although Examiners are not bound to follow other Examiners’ interpretations, knowledge of a potentially different interpretation is clearly information that an Examiner could consider important when examining an application.  [Slip Op., pgs. 15-16]

The Federal Circuit then explained that a rejection in a first application is material to the examination of a second application, because the applicant is asserting, in both cases, that all of the claims are patentable.  Therefore, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the fact that one Examiner is rejecting the claims in the first application is “inconsistent with” the positions being asserted by the applicant to another Examiner in the second application.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit explained that “a prior rejection of a substantially similar claim [in the first application] refutes, or is inconsistent with the position that those claims are patentable [in the second application].

This holding is particularly troubling, in that it forces applicants to disclose in a second application the existence of a rejection of similar claims in a first application handled by a different Examiner even if the applicant completely disagrees with the rejection asserted in the first application.  This is completely unreasonable, since many times rejections asserted by U.S. PTO Examiners are baseless.

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